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Abstract
We propose a privacy-preserving framework for learn-
ing visual classifiers by leveraging distributed private im-
age data. This framework is designed to aggregate mul-
tiple classifiers updated locally using private data and to
ensure that no private information about the data is ex-
posed during and after its learning procedure. We utilize
a homomorphic cryptosystem that can aggregate the lo-
cal classifiers while they are encrypted and thus kept se-
cret. To overcome the high computational cost of homomor-
phic encryption of high-dimensional classifiers, we (1) im-
pose sparsity constraints on local classifier updates and (2)
propose a novel efficient encryption scheme named doubly-
permuted homomorphic encryption (DPHE) which is tai-
lored to sparse high-dimensional data. DPHE (i) decom-
poses sparse data into its constituent non-zero values and
their corresponding support indices, (ii) applies homomor-
phic encryption only to the non-zero values, and (iii) em-
ploys double permutations on the support indices to make
them secret. Our experimental evaluation on several public
datasets shows that the proposed approach achieves com-
parable performance against state-of-the-art visual recog-
nition methods while preserving privacy and significantly
outperforms other privacy-preserving methods.
1. Introduction
An enormous amount of photos and videos are captured
everyday thanks to the proliferation of camera technology.
Such data has played a pivotal role in the progress of com-
puter vision algorithms and the development of computer
vision applications. For instance, a collection of photos up-
(1)	Sharing	classifier	𝑤"#
(2)	Updating	the	classifier
locally	with	private	data
1
2
Users
Aggregator
𝑤#(%)
𝑤#(')
𝑤"#('= 12 𝑤#' +𝑤#%
(3)	Averaging	locally-updated
classifiers	
Figure 1. Learning a Classifier by an Aggregator and Users. (1)
Given classifier w¯t shared by an aggregator (e.g., the administrator
of a cloud storage); (2) users update it locally using private data
and send updated classifier w(1)t ,w
(2)
t to the aggregator; and (3)
the aggregator collects and averages the locally-updated classifiers
to obtain a better one: w¯t+1 = 12 (w
(1)
t +w
(2)
t ). How can users
keepw(1)t ,w
(2)
t secret from the aggregator and other users?
loaded to Flickr has enabled large-scale 3D reconstruction
[2] and city attribute analysis [71]. More recently, a large-
scale YouTube video dataset has been released to drive the
development of the next phase of new computer vision al-
gorithms [1]. Arguably, much of the progress made in com-
puter vision in the last decade has been driven by data that
has been shared publicly, typically after careful curation.
Interestingly, we do not always share captured data pub-
licly but just store it on a personal storage [35], and such pri-
vate data contains various moments of everyday life that are
not found in publicly shared data [5, 13, 34, 37]. Accessing
extensive amounts of private data could lead to tremendous
advances in computer vision and AI technology. However
there is a dilemma. On one hand, leveraging this diverse and
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abundant source of data could significantly enhance visual
recognition capabilities and enable novel applications. On
the other hand, using private data comes with its own chal-
lenge: how can we leverage distributed private data sources
while preserving the privacy of the data and its owners?
To address this challenge, we develop a privacy preserv-
ing framework that can learn a visual classifier from dis-
tributed private data. As illustrated in Figure 1, we consider
the following two types of parties: users who own private
data and an aggregator who wishes to make use of them.
They collaboratively learn a classifier as follows: (1) given
a classifier shared by the aggregator; (2) users update it lo-
cally with their own data; and (3) the aggregator collects
and averages the locally-updated classifiers to obtain a bet-
ter one. These steps iterate multiple times until the aggre-
gator and the users get a high-performance classifier which
has been trained on a large collection of private data. As a
practical example, suppose that people capture life-logging
videos passively with a wearable camera and store them on
a cloud storage. By allowing the cloud administrator to cu-
rate these videos, he will be able to learn activity classi-
fiers [22, 23, 41, 51, 54, 59] from realistic and diverse data.
However, because such videos inevitably include any pri-
vate moment that came into the view of cameras, the ad-
ministrator should ensure that no private information in the
videos is leaked during and after the learning procedure.
One possible solution for preserving privacy is to perturb
classifier weights by adding noise [49, 52]. Users could also
sanitize their data by detecting and removing sensitive im-
ages [22, 39, 62] or transforming images into low-resolution
ones [55]. We stress here that these approaches however in-
volve strong trade-off between data degradation and data
utility – the more information we hide, the less effective the
data is for learning classifiers.
An attractive solution for privacy-preserving learning
without such trade-off is the use of homomorphic cryptosys-
tems — a class of cryptosystems that can allow for basic
arithmetic operations over encrypted data [25]. For exam-
ple, the Paillier cryptosystem [48] calculates the encrypted
sum of data as follows: ζ
(
x(1) + x(2)
)
= ζ
(
x(1)
)
ζ
(
x(2)
)
where ζ (x) is the ciphertext of value x and never reveals
the original x without a decryption key. This unique prop-
erty of homomorphic cryptosystems has enabled a variety of
privacy-preserving machine learning and data mining tech-
niques (e.g., [8, 17, 28, 49, 61, 69]). By homomorphically
encrypting locally-updated classifiers, the aggregator can
average them while ensuring that the classifiers never ex-
pose private information about the trained data.
However, homomorphic encryption involves pro-
hibitively high computational cost rendering it unsuitable
for many tasks that need to learn high-dimensional weights.
For example, in our experiments, we aim to learn a
classifier for recognizing 101 objects in the Caltech101
dataset [24] using 2048-dimensional deep features. Paillier
encryption with a 1024-bit key takes about 3 ms for a single
weight using a modern CPU1. Therefore, encryption of
each classifier will require more than 10 minutes.
To leverage homomorphic encryption for our privacy-
preserving framework, we present a novel encryption
scheme named doubly-permuted homomorphic encryption
(DPHE), which allows high-dimensional classifiers to be
updated securely and efficiently. The key observation is
that, if we enforce sparsity constraints on the classifier up-
dates, the updated weights can be decomposed into a small
number of non-zero values and corresponding support in-
dices. DPHE then applies homomorphic encryption only to
non-zero values. Because the support indices could also be
private information (e.g., when classifier weights take bi-
nary values [12, 15, 30]), we design a shuffling algorithm
of the indices based on two different permutation matrices.
This shuffling ensures that 1) only the data owners can iden-
tify the original indices and 2) an aggregator can still aver-
age classifiers while they are encrypted and shuffled. By
adopting a sparsity constraint of more than 90%, DPHE re-
duces the classifier encryption time of the previous example
on Caltech101 to about one minute.
We evaluate our visual learning framework on a vari-
ety of tasks ranging from object classification on the clas-
sic Caltech101/256 datasets [24, 29] to more practical and
sensitive tasks with a large-scale dataset including face at-
tribute recognition on the CelebA dataset [44] and sensitive
place detection on the Life-logging dataset [22]. Exper-
imental results demonstrate that our framework performs
significantly better than several existing privacy-preserving
methods [49, 52] in terms of classification accuracy. We
also achieve comparable classification performance to some
state-of-the-art visual recognition methods [31, 44, 70].
Related Work
Privacy preservation has been actively studied in several
areas including cryptography, statistics, machine learning,
and data mining. One long-studied topic in cryptography
is secure multiparty computation [67], which aims at com-
puting some statistics (e.g., sum, maximum) securely over
private data owned by multiple parties. More practical tasks
include privacy-preserving data mining [3, 4], ubiquitous
computing [40], and social network analysis [72].
One popular technique for preserving privacy is by per-
turbing outputs or intermediate results of algorithms based
on the theory of differential privacy (DP) [18, 19]. DP
was classically introduced “to release statistical information
without compromising the privacy of the individual respon-
1A single CPU of a MacBook Pro with a 2.9GHz Intel Core i7 was
used with python-paillier (https://github.com/n1analytics/
python-paillier) and gmpy2 (https://pypi.python.org/
pypi/gmpy2; a C-coded multiple-precision arithmetic module.)
dents [19],” where the individual respondents are samples in
a database and the statistical information is a certain statis-
tic (e.g., average) of those samples. This can be done by
adding properly-calibrated random noise to the statistical
information such that one cannot distinguish the presence
of an arbitrary single sample in the database. DP was then
adapted and used also in the context of privacy-preserving
machine learning, e.g., [10, 11, 14, 49, 52, 58]. In the clas-
sification cases, a training dataset and classifier weights are
referred to as a database and its statistical information, re-
spectively. By adding properly-calibrated random noise to
the classifier weights (a.k.a. output perturbation [11]) or ob-
jective functions (objective perturbation), DP-based classi-
fication methods aim to prevent the classifier from leaking
the presence of individual samples in the training dataset.
While these methods are computationally efficient, the per-
turbed results are not the exact same as what could be orig-
inally learned from the given data. Moreover, the scale of
noise typically increases exponentially to the level of pri-
vacy preservation (e.g., [20]). Perfect privacy preservation
can never be achieved as long as one wishes to get some
meaningful results from data.
Another privacy-preserving technique is the use of ho-
momorphic cryptosystems [47], which we will study in this
work. The homomorphic cryptosystems also enable a va-
riety of privacy-preserving machine learning and data min-
ing [8, 17, 28, 43, 49, 50, 61, 64, 69] because they can make
some weights perfectly secret by encrypting them. Unlike
the DP-based approaches, homomorphic encryption does
not compromise the accuracy of algorithm outputs at the ex-
pense of its high computational cost. Our key contribution
is to resolve this computational cost problem by introducing
a new efficient encryption scheme.
Finally, studies on privacy preservation in computer vi-
sion are still limited. Recent work includes sensitive place
detection [22, 39, 62] and privacy-preserving activity recog-
nition [55]. These methods are designed to sanitize private
information in a dataset and involve the potential trade-off
between data security and utility. Another relevant topic
is privacy-preserving face retrieval based on homomorphic
encryption [21, 56]. Because these methods encrypt all data
samples, they can be applied only to thousands of data,
while our approach can accept hundreds of thousands of
data as input based on a distributed learning framework.
2. Efficient Encryption Scheme for Privacy-
Preserving Learning of Classifiers
The goal of this work is privacy-preserving learning
of visual classifiers over distributed image data privately
owned by people. As described earlier, our framework in-
volves two types of parties: users {U (n) | n = 1, . . . , N}
who individually own labeled image data and an aggrega-
tor who exploits the data for learning classifiers while en-
suring that no privacy information about the data is leaked
during and after the learning procedure.
2.1. Privacy-Preserving Learning Framework
We first describe how classifiers can be learned from dis-
tributed data. Let us denote classifier weights at step t by
D-dimensional vector w¯t ∈ RD. We assume that the ini-
tial weight vector w¯0 is provided by an aggregator, for ex-
ample by using some public data already published on the
web. As shown in Figure 1, (1) weight vector w¯t is first
shared from an aggregator to users. (2) User U (n) updates
w¯t locally with own labeled data and sends updated classi-
fier w(n)t to the aggregator, and (3) the aggregator averages
locally-updated classifiers for the initial weights of the next
step: w¯t+1 = 1N
∑
nw
(n)
t .
This framework, however, is vulnerable to potential pri-
vacy leakage at multiple places. An aggregator can have
access to {w(n)t | n = 1, . . . , N} each of which reflects
user’s private data. In addition, if a communication path be-
tween user and aggregator sides is not secure, w(n)t could
also be intercepted by another user via man-in-the-middle
attacks. If w(n)t is updated via stochastic gradient descent
(SGD), the difference of two classifier weights w(n)t − w¯t
could be used to identify a part of the trained private data.
Some concrete examples of how private data can be leaked
are shown in our supplementary material.
Our new encryption scheme, the doubly-permuted ho-
momorphic encryption (DPHE), is designed to prevent pri-
vacy leakage by homomorphically encryptingw(n)t . By im-
posing sparse constraints on local classifier updates (e.g.,
[27, 63, 73]), the DPHE exploits the sparsity to encrypt
high-dimensional classifiers efficiently. In Section 2.2, we
first explain briefly an algorithm to average local classi-
fiers securely based on the Paillier cryptosystem [48]. Then
Section 2.3 and Section 2.4 present how DPHE ‘doubly-
permutes’ sparse data on a step-by-step basis. For sim-
plicity, we will focus on one particular step by omitting
time index t, that is, we consider the problem of comput-
ing w¯ = 1N
∑
nw
(n) securely.
2.2. Secure-Sum with Paillier Encryption
Let us start from a simple secure-sum algorithm where
each ofN users {U (n) | n = 1, . . . , N} sends a single value
w(n) ∈ R to an aggregator, and the aggregator computes
their sum wsum =
∑
n w
(n), provided that w(n) is never
exposed to any other party but user U (n). To accomplish
this, we utilize the Paillier cryptosystem [48]. Let us denote
by ζ (w), the ciphertext of value w ∈ R2. As shown in [48],
ζ (w) cannot be inverted to the original value w without a
2Although the Paillier cryptosystem originally works only on a positive
integer, we can deal with real valuesw ∈ R by scaling them to be a positive
integer before encryption and rescaling them after decryption properly.
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Figure 2. Secure-Sum with Paillier Encryption. Vectors
w(1),w(2) are first encrypted with the Paillier cryptosystem. Ci-
phertexts ζ(w(1)), ζ(w(2)) are then used to compute encrypted
sum ζ(w(1)+w(2)). After the decryption we obtainw(1)+w(2).
decryption key. Also, because the encryption always in-
volves generation of random numbers, multiple encryptions
of the same values will result in different ciphertexts.
To enable this secure-sum algorithm, we introduce a key
generator who issues encryption and decryption keys and
distributes the only encryption key to all of the parties. User
U (n) then sends to the aggregator ζ
(
w(n)
)
that is encrypted
with the given encryption key. Using the Paillier encryp-
tion, the product of two ciphertexts results in a ciphertext
of the two original plaintexts, i.e., ζ
(
w(1)
)
ζ
(
w(2)
)
=
ζ
(
w(1) + w(2)
)
3. Therefore, the aggregator can compute
the encrypted sum of values as follows:
ζ (wsum) = ζ
(∑
n
w(n)
)
=
∏
n
ζ
(
w(n)
)
. (1)
Finally, the aggregator asks the key generator for decrypt-
ing ζ (wsum) and receives wsum. As long as all the parties
strictly follow this algorithm, privacy of U (n) can be pre-
served by restricting the aggregator’s access to w(n).
The straightforward extension of this secure-sum algo-
rithm for averaging locally-updated classifiers,w(n) ∈ RD,
is to apply the Paillier encryption element-wise. In what
follows, let wsum = w¯N ∈ RD and let ζ (w) be a D-
dimensional vector which elements are individually Paillier
encrypted. Similar to Equation (1), wsum can be computed
securely as follows (see Figure 2 for a two-vector case):
ζ (wsum) = ζ
(∑
n
w(n)
)
= nζ
(
w(n)
)
, (2)
where n is the element-wise product of multiple vectors
3Specifically, Paillier encryption is defined as ζ (x) = gxrTmod T 2
where the pair of values (g, T ) is an encryption key and r is a random num-
ber generated per encryption. Given ζ
(
x(1)
)
= gx
(1)
(r(1))Tmod T 2
and ζ
(
x(2)
)
= gx
(2)
(r(2))Tmod T 2, the encrypted sum is derived
as follows: ζ
(
x(1)
)
ζ
(
x(2)
)
= gx
(1)+x(2) (r(1)r(2))Tmod T 2 =
ζ
(
x(1) + x(2)
)
. Further details can be found in [25, 48].
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Figure 3. Secure-sum with Efficient Encryption with Permuta-
tions. (1) While applying the Paillier encryption only to v(n), we
shuffle index matrixK(n) with permutation matrixφ to keep it se-
cure. (2) An aggregator can compute encrypted and shuffled sum
φζ(w(1) +w(2)) and can ask a key generator for decryption and
reordering to obtainw(1) +w(2).
over index n. Then, the aggregator receiveswsum with help
from the key generator and computes w¯ = 1Nwsum.
2.3. Encryption with Single Permutation
The extension based on Equation (2) would, however,
become infeasible for learning high-dimensional classifiers
due to the high computational cost of homomorphic encryp-
tion. DPHE can overcome this problem by applying the ho-
momorphic encryption only to a limited part of classifier
weights that are updated with sparse constraints.
Let us first introduce encryption capacity M that limits
the number of values that are Paillier encrypted. We also de-
note by nz(w(n)), the actual number of non-zeros in w(n).
By choosing M such that nz(w(n)) ≤ M ≤ D, w(n) can
be decomposed into a pair of real-value vector v(n) ∈ RM
and binary matrix K(n) ∈ {0, 1}D×M :
w(n) = K(n)v(n), (3)
where v(n) includes all the constituent non-zero values in
w(n). K(n) is an index matrix where the number of ones
for each column is exact one and that for each row is at
most one, and the m-th column of K(n) indicates the index
of the m-th value of v(n) in vector w(n). Users encrypt the
only v(n) with the Paillier cryptosystem to obtain ζ
(
v(n)
)
.
If nz(w(n))  D, i.e., w(n) is sparse, we can make this
encryption more efficient by choosing smallerM . Note that
there are multiple decompositions that satisfy Equation (3),
and users can arbitrarily choose one of them.
Now, the remaining problem is how to keep K(n) secret.
This matrix indicates non-zero indices of w(n) and could
also be private information for users. For instance, when
classifier weights take binary values (e.g., [12, 15, 30]), all
non-zero values in w(n) become one and the private infor-
mation is found inK(n). To solve this problem, we propose
shuffling K(n) with permutation matrix φ ∈ {0, 1}D×D,
where the number of ones for each row and for each column
is exact one. This permutation matrix is 1) generated ran-
domly by a key generator and 2) shared only among users,
which we therefore refer to as user-shared (U-S) permuta-
tion matrix. As illustrated in Figure 3 (1), each user sends
φK(n) to an aggregator. The aggregator cannot identify
K(n) due to the absence of φ but is still able to compute the
encrypted and shuffled sum ofw(n), namely φζ (wsum), as
follows (see also Figure 3 (2)):
φζ (wsum) = φζ
(∑
n
w(n)
)
= nφζ
(
w(n)
)
. (4)
Here, φζ
(
w(n)
)
is constructed as:
φζ
(
w(n)
)
= Y (n) + Enc0 · Z(n), (5)
Y (n) = φK(n)ζ
(
v(n)
)
, Z(n) = 1D − φK(n)1M , (6)
where 1D,1M are all-one vectors of lengthD andM . Enc0
is a ciphertext of a zero computed only once by the aggre-
gator. Vector Z(n) adds Enc0 to the locations of zeros in
Y (n), which is necessary to compute φζ (wsum) based on
Equation (2). Finally, the aggregator asks the key generator
for reordering and decrypting φζ (wsum) to obtain wsum.
Choosing encryption capacity M The most efficient ap-
proach to choose M is by letting each user adjust M in-
dependently such that M (n) = nz(w(n)). However, this
approach will reveal nz(w(n)) to an aggregator, which is
less critical but still private information. Alternatively, one
can keep nz(w(n)) secret as follows: First, the key genera-
tor determines M such that M  D. If nz(w(n)) ≤ M
holds, a user encrypts w(n) as presented above. Other-
wise, the user arbitrarily splits w(n) into several shards
w(n,1), . . . ,w(n,F ) such that
∑
f w
(n,f) = w(n) and
maxf{nz(w(n,f)) | f = 1, . . . , F} ≤ M . The user then
encrypts and sends w(n,f) one-by-one, and the aggregator
receives them as if they are individual data. This modifica-
tion does not affect output wsum and is still efficient than
naive encryption of all values as long as nz(w(n)) D.
2.4. Encryption with Double Permutations
The U-S permutation matrix φ ensures that K(n) is se-
cure against an aggregator. However, because φ is shared
Algorithm 1 Averaging Classifiers Securely with DPHE
Require: N users {U (n) | n = 1, . . . , N} who privately
ownD-dimensional classifier weightsw(n), aggregator
A, key generator G, and encryption capacity M .
Ensure: Averaged classifier w¯ = 1N
∑
nw
(n)
1: G generates encryption key ζ (·) and the correspond-
ing decryption key, U-S permutation matrix φ and U-A
permutation matrices {φ(n) | n = 1, . . . , N}.
2: G distributes ζ (·) ,φ,φ(n),M to U (n) and
ζ (·) , {φ(n) | n = 1, . . . , N} to C.
3: U (n) decomposes w(n) into v(n) and K(n).
4: U (n) sends ζ
(
v(n)
)
,Φ
(
K(n)
)
to A.
5: A computes φζ
(
w(n)
)
for each n to get φζ (wsum).
6: A asks G for decrypting and reordering φζ (wsum) to
receive wsum, and computes w¯ = 1Nwsum.
among all users, K(n) could be identified by a malicious
user who intercepts φK(n) via man-in-the-middle attacks.
To address this issue, DPHE involves another set of per-
mutation matrices to shuffle K(n): user-aggregator (U-A)
permutation matrices {φ(n) ∈ {0, 1}D×D | n = 1, . . . , N}
where φ(n) is a permutation matrix defined in the same way
as φ but is shared only between the user U (n) and the ag-
gregator. Both of the U-S and U-A permutation matrices
are generated by the key generator and distributed properly.
Then, each user doubly-permutes K(n) as follows:
Φ
(
K(n)
)
= φ(n)φK(n). (7)
Because the reordering of Φ
(
K(n)
)
requires both φ and
φ(n), DPHE can now prevent an aggregator as well as any
other user than U (n) from identifying K(n).
Importantly, because the aggregator knows all U-A per-
mutation matrices {φ(n) ∈ {0, 1}D×D | n = 1, . . . , N},
Φ
(
K(n)
)
can be reordered partially to obtain φK(n):
φK(n) = (φ(n))>Φ
(
K(n)
)
. (8)
Note that (φ(n))> = (φ(n))−1. This allows the aggre-
gator to compute φζ (wsum) based on Equation (4) by
replacing φK(n) in Y (n) and Z(n) in Equation (6) with
(φ(n))>Φ
(
K(n)
)
. Algorithm 1 summarizes how DPHE
can average local classifiers securely and efficiently.
2.5. Security Evaluation
This section briefly describes that DPHE is guaranteed to
be secure under certain assumptions. A more formal evalu-
ation is present in our supplementary material.
Assumptions Recall that our framework involves users,
an aggregator, and a key generator. Our security evaluation
is built upon one of the classical assumptions in cryptogra-
phy that they are all semi-honest — each party “follows the
protocol properly with the exception that it keeps a record
of all its intermediate computations” [47]. For instance, the
aggregator is not allowed to ask the key generator to de-
crypt individual classifier φζ
(
w(n)
)
while he may use w¯
to identify w(n). We also assume that there is no collusion
among the parties. For example, we will not consider cases
where the aggregator and the key generator collude to share
a Paillier decryption key and where the aggregator and all
but one users collude to collect {w(j) | j 6= n} to reveal
w(n). These assumptions are justified in some practical ap-
plications such as crowdsourcing [38] and multiparty ma-
chine learning [49]. Finally, as described in Section 2.1, we
consider a case where malicious users may intercept data
sent from other users to the aggregator by slightly abusing
the semi-honesty assumption.
Security on Algorithm 1 With the assumptions above,
we can guarantee that no one but user U (n) can identify
w(n) and its non-zero indices K(n) during and after run-
ning Algorithm 1 if the number of users satisfies N ≥ 3.
Specifically, non-zero weights of w(n), v(n), are encrypted
with the Pailler cryptosystem, which prevents an aggre-
gator and all users from identifying v(n) from its cipher-
text ζ
(
v(n)
)
as they do not have a decryption key. Also,
they cannot identify K(n) from its doubly-permuted form
Φ
(
K(n)
)
due to the lack of either U-S permutation matrix
φ or U-A matrix φ(n). Although the key generator owns
the decryption key and all of the permutation matrices, he
does not access v(n) and K(n) in the algorithm. Finally, w¯
cannot be used to identifyw(n) when N ≥ 3. For example,
when N = 3, user U (1) gets w¯ = 13 (w
(1) +w(2) +w(3)).
However, U (1) can only compute 3w¯−w(1) = w(2)+w(3),
which still remains ambiguous to identify w(2) and w(3).
Similarly, non-zero indices of w¯ is just the union of those
of w(n) and not useful to reveal K(n). This security on w¯
holds also for the aggregator and the key generator.
Limitations The requirement of N ≥ 3 implies that, if
only one or two users are available at one time, the aggre-
gator will never publish classifiers without revealing each
user’s updates. Moreover, we cannot prevent certain attacks
using published classifiers to infer potentially-private data,
e.g., using a face recognition model and its output to recon-
struct face images specific to the output [26], although such
attacks are not currently able to identify which users pri-
vately owned the reconstructed data in a distributed setting.
3. Experiments
In this section, we address several visual recognition
tasks with our privacy-preserving learning framework based
on DPHE. Specifically, we first evaluate DPHE empirically
under various conditions systematically with object clas-
sification tasks on Caltech101 [24] and Caltech256 [29]
datasets. Then we tackle more practical and sensitive tasks:
face attribute recognition on the CelebA dataset [44] and
sensitive place detection on the Life-logging dataset [22].
3.1. Settings of Experiments
Throughout our experiments, we learned a linear SVM
via SGD. We employed the elastic net [73], i.e., the combi-
nation of L1 and L2 regularizations, to enforce sparsity on
locally-updated classifiers. For a simulation purpose, mul-
tiple users, an aggregator, and a key generator were all im-
plemented in a single computer and thus no transmissions
among them were considered in the experiments.
As a baseline, we adopted the following two off-the-shelf
privacy-preserving machine learning methods. Similar to
our approach, these methods were designed to learn clas-
sifiers over distributed private data while ensuring that no
private information about distributed data was leaked dur-
ing and after the learning procedure.
PRR10 [49] Users first train D-dimensional linear classi-
fiers locally using their own data. They then aver-
age the locally-trained classifiers followed by adding
a D-dimensional Laplace noise vector to the output
classifier based on differential privacy. Because the
scale of noise depends on the size of local user data
and thus involves private information, the noise vec-
tor is encrypted with the Paillier cryptosystem (i.e.,
this method needs D-times encryptions). An L2-
regularized logistic regression classifier was trained by
each user via SGD.
RA12 [52] Similar to our approach, RA12 iteratively av-
erages locally-updated classifiers to get a better clas-
sifier. Unlike our method and PRR10, each local
classifier is updated in a gradient descent fashion
while adding the combination of Laplace and Gaus-
sian noises to its objective function to prevent learned
classifiers from leaking private information based on
differential privacy. We employed an L2-regularized
linear SVM for each of local classifiers.
These methods involve hyper-parameters  ∈ R+, δ ∈ R+
to control the strength of privacy preservation. We followed
the original papers [49, 52] and set to  = 0.2, δ = 0.05,
which were adjusted and justified in the papers to preserve
privacy while keeping high recognition performances.
We set N = 5 for these two baselines and our method,
that is, five users were assumed to participate in a task. En-
cryption capacity M was set to M = d0.1D · NC e , where
D was the dimension of learned classifiers and NC was the
number of classes. If each of locally-updated classifiers has
Table 1. Object Recognition on Caltech101/256: mean and stan-
dard deviation of classification accuracies (%) averaged over ob-
ject categories. Note that the scores of HZRS14 and ZF13 were
cited from their original papers [31, 70].
Methods Caltech101 Caltech256 Privacy
HZRS14 [31] 93.4± 0.5 N/A 7
ZF13 [70] 85.4± 0.4 72.6±0.1 7
PRR10 [49] 41.6± 1.2 55.9± 0.5 3
RA12 [52] 83.8± 1.1 68.0± 0.3 3
DPHE 89.3± 0.8 74.7± 0.4 3
more than 90% sparsity, its weights can be encrypted and
transmitted at one time (see Section 2.3).
3.2. Performance Analysis on Caltech101/256
We compared DPHE against the privacy-preserving
baselines [49, 52] as well as some of the state-of-the-art ob-
ject classification methods [31, 70] on Caltech101/256 ob-
ject classification datasets. Our evaluation was based on
the protocol shown in [31, 70] as follows. For Caltech101
dataset [24], we generated training and testing data by ran-
domly picking 30 and no more than 50 images respectively
for each category. On the other hand, for the Caltech256
dataset [29], we chose random 60 images per category for
training data and the rest of images for testing data.
Recall that our learning framework requires some initial-
ization data for obtaining the initial weights w¯0. Therefore,
we first 1) left 10% of the training data for the initialization
data and 2) split 90% of them into five subsets of the same
size, which we regarded as private image data of five users.
For the two baselines [49, 52], we added 1) to each of 2) to
serve as private data of each user. This ensured that in both
of our method and the baselines each user had access to the
same image set. We ran the evaluation ten times to get a
mean and a standard deviation of classification accuracies
averaged over all the categories.
For our method and the baselines, we extracted 2048-
dimensional outputs of the global-average pooling layer of
the deep residual network [32] with 152 layers trained on
ImageNet [53] as a feature, which was then normalized to
have zero-mean and unit-variance for each dimension. In
our method, the relative strength of L1 regularization in
the elastic net was fixed to 0.5, and the overall strength of
elastic-net regularization was adjusted adaptively so that lo-
cal classifiers had more than 90% sparsity on average.
Comparisons to other methods Table 1 presents classifi-
cation accuracies of all the methods. Our method performed
almost comparably well to state-of-the-art methods [31, 70]
while preserving privacy. We also found that DPHE outper-
formed the privacy-preserving baselines [49, 52]. We here
emphasize that DPHE was designed to preserve privacy
Table 2. Sparsity (%), Classification Accuracy (%), and En-
cryption Time (sec) of DPHE on Caltech101.
Sparsity Accuracy Time
0.01 89.7 620
79.1 89.6 186
95.6 88.2 62
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Figure 4. Classification Accuracy (%) with Different Numbers
of Users on Caltech101. Left: users own the fixed number of
partially-duplicated images. Right: users own the decreasing num-
ber (inversely proportional to N ) of non-duplicated images.
without adding any noise on locally-updated or averaged
classifiers, which would be one main reason of our perfor-
mance improvements over the two baselines. RA12 [52] in-
evitably needs to add noise on local classifiers, and still does
not preserve privacy perfectly due to the trade-off between
data utility and security. On the other hand, PRR10 [49]
achieves better privacy preservation thanks to the combina-
tion of homomorphic encryption and perturbed classifiers.
However, this baseline did not employ iterative updates of
classifiers unlike other methods and thus could not effec-
tively leverage distributed training data.
Encryption time Table 2 depicts the relationship between
the sparsity of locally-updated classifiers (averaged over all
users and all iterations), classification accuracies, and en-
cryption times of DPHE on Caltech101. We adjusted the
sparsity by changing the relative strength of L1 regulariza-
tion in the elastic net. Overall, the increase of sparsity lit-
tle affected the classification performance. The compari-
son between the top and the bottom rows of the table in-
dicates that we achieved ten times faster encryption at the
cost of the only 1.5 percent points decrease of classifica-
tion accuracies. Note that PRR10 [49] requires to encrypt a
2048-dimensional dense noise vector for privacy preserva-
tion, which took about 620 sec in this condition.
Number of users We also investigate how the number
of users N affected classification performances on Cal-
tech101 under two different conditions. In the left of Fig-
ure 4, we repeated multiple (1, 2, 5, 10, and 20) times
the random split of training data into five subsets. This
yielded N = 5, 10, 25, 50, 100 subsets each of which has
the fixed number of partially duplicated images. We found
Table 3. Face Attribute Recognition on CelebA Dataset : mean
accuracies (%) over 40 face attribute labels. The score of LLWT15
was cited from their original paper [44].
Methods Accuracy Privacy
LLWT15 [44] 87 7
PRR10 [49] 78 3
RA12 [52] 64 3
DPHE 84 3
that the increase of user sizes hardly affected classification
performances but slightly made it worse when N = 100.
On the right of the figure, we split the training data into
N = 5, 10, 25, 50, 100 subsets. While this split ensured
that there were no duplicated images across multiple sub-
sets, the number of images in each subset decreased as N
became larger. The result with this condition implies that
DPHE requires each user to own a sufficient number of im-
ages to make each local update stable.
3.3. Practical Examples
As proof-of-concept applications, this section addresses
two practical visual learning tasks where training images
could be highly private and need privacy preservation: face
attribute recognition and sensitive place detection. Note that
the following experiments are practical also in terms of data
size: the two datasets used in the experiments contained
more than one hundred thousand images in total.
Face attribute recognition We first adopted a face
attribute recognition task on the CelebFaces Attributes
(CelebA) Dataset [44] comprising 202,599 face images
with 40 attribute labels (e.g., big lips, oval faces, young). As
a feature, we used 512-dimensional outputs of the FC5 layer
of the face recognition network [66] trained on the CASIA
WebFace [68]. All face images were cropped and aligned
using provided facial landmarks. We used validation data
(19,868 images) for initialization data and split training data
(162,770 images) into five subsets to run our method with
N = 5. Similar to the previous experiments, we added
the initialization data to each of the five subsets to serve
as one of the five private data for privacy-preserving base-
lines [49, 52]. The regularization strength of our method
was adjusted so that the sparsity of local classifiers was
about 75% on average, which required about 14 seconds
for encrypting each classifier. Table 3 reports a recognition
accuracy averaged over all of the 40 face attributes. DPHE
worked comparably well to the state-of-the-art method [44]
and outperformed privacy-preserving baselines [49, 52].
Sensitive place detection Another interesting application
where privacy preservation plays an important role is sen-
sitive place detection presented in [22, 39, 62]. This task
Table 4. Sensitive Place Detection on Life-logging Dataset: av-
erage precision for detecting images of sensitive places.
Methods PRR10 [49] RA12 [52] DPHE
Average Precision 0.546 0.704 0.729
aims at detecting images of a place where sensitive infor-
mation could be involved, such as those of bathrooms and
laptop screens. We used the Life-logging dataset [22] that
contained 131,287 training images selected from the Mi-
crosoft COCO [42] and Flickr8k [33] datasets, and 7,210
testing images recorded by a wearable life-logging camera.
Following [22], images with specific annotations: ‘toilet,’
‘bathroom,’ ‘locker,’ ‘lavatory,’ ‘washroom,’ ‘computer,’
‘laptop,’ ‘iphone,’ ‘smartphone,’ and ‘screen’ were regarded
as sensitive ones. We used a 4096-dimensional deep feature
provided in the work [22]. 132 images containing both sen-
sitive and non-sensitive samples were chosen randomly for
initialization data and the rest was split into five subsets to
serve as private data. The regularization strength was cho-
sen such that sparsity of local updates was more than 95%
on average, which required only 1.2 seconds for encryp-
tion. Table 4 presents average precision scores for detect-
ing sensitive places with our method and the two privacy-
preserving baselines. Note that the method in the origi-
nal paper [22] could not be compared directly due to the
absence of its average precision score and different exper-
imental conditions (i.e., smaller numbers of training and
testing images were used). We confirmed that DPHE per-
formed fairly well compared to the two baselines.
4. Conclusion
We developed a privacy-preserving framework with a
new encryption scheme DPHE for learning visual classi-
fiers securely over distributed private data. Our exper-
iments show that the proposed framework outperformed
other privacy-preserving baselines [49, 52] in terms of accu-
racy and worked comparably well to several state-of-the-art
visual recognition methods.
Although we focused exclusively on the learning of lin-
ear classifiers, DPHE can encrypt any type of sparse high-
dimensional data efficiently and thus could be used for other
tasks. One interesting task is distributed unsupervised or
semi-supervised learning which will not require users to
annotate all private data. Another promising direction for
the future work is learning much higher-dimensional mod-
els like sparse convolutional neural networks [7, 60]. Our
privacy-preserving framework will make it easy to provide
diverse data sources for learning such complex models.
A. Supplementary Material
A.1. Some Statistics on Public/Private Images
We are interested in leveraging ‘private’ images, which
are not shared publicly but just saved on a personal storage
privately, for visual learning. In this section, we would like
to provide some statistics that motivate our work.
Based on the recent report from Kleiner Perkins Cau-
field & Byers [46], the number of photos shared publicly
on several social networking services (Snapchat, Instagram,
WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, and Facebook) per day
has reached almost 3.5 billion in 2015. It also shows that
the number of smartphone users in the world was about 2.5
billion in the same year. From these statistics, if everyone
takes three photos per day on average, about four billion
photos in total would be stored privately everyday. Some
prior work [34, 35] has shown that such private photos still
contained meaningful information including people, faces,
and written texts, as well as some sensitive information like
a computer screen and a bedroom. Our privacy-preserving
framework is designed to learn visual classifiers by leverag-
ing this vast amount of private images while preserving the
privacy of the owners.
A.2. Examples of Privacy Leakage from Locally-
Updated Classifiers
In our framework, users update classifier weights w¯t ∈
RD locally using their own private data and send the up-
dated ones w(n)t ∈ RD to the aggregator. Here we discuss
how the combination of w¯t and w
(n)
t can be used to reveal
a part of the trained data.
Let us denote a labeled sample by zi = (xi, yi) where
xi ∈ RD is a feature vector and yi ∈ {−1, 1} is a binary
label. The whole data privately owned by a single user is
then described by Z = {zi | i = 1, . . . ,K}. In order to
learn a classifier, we minimize a regularized loss function
which is defined with weights w and data Z as follows:
Q(Z,w) = `(Z,w) + λR(w), (9)
where `(Z,w) is a loss function, R(w) is a certain regular-
izer, and λ is a regularization strength.
A.2.1 Stochastic Gradient Descent
As described in Section 2.1 of the original paper, a part of
trained private data could be leaked when users update a
classifier via stochastic gradient descent (SGD). With SGD,
users obtain weights w(n)t by updating w¯t based on the
gradient of regularized loss with respect to single sample
zt = (xt, yt) ∈ Z picked randomly from Z [9]:
w
(n)
t = w¯t − γt∇w¯tQ(zt, w¯t), (10)
where γt is a learning rate at time step t and controls how
much one can learn from the sample zt. Loss gradient
∇w¯tQ(zt, w¯t) is described as follows:
∇w¯tQ(zt, w¯t) = ∇w¯t`(zt, w¯t) + λ∇w¯tR(w¯t). (11)
By plugging Equation (11) into Equation (10), we obtain:
∇w¯t`(zt, w¯t) =
w¯t −w(n)t+1
γt
− λ∇w¯tR(w¯t). (12)
Now we are interested in what one can know about
zt = (w¯t, yt) from Equation (12) where both w¯t andw
(n)
t+1
are given. If the type of regularizer R(·) can be identified
(e.g., L2 regularization), ∇w¯tR(w¯t) can be computed ex-
actly. In addition, if concrete parameters for γt and λ can
be guessed (e.g., when using a default parameter of open
source libraries) and if a specific loss function is used for
`(zt, w¯t), one can narrow down the private sample zt to
several candidates.
Specifically, let Θ be the RHS of Equation (12), which is
given when R(·) is identified and γt, λ is estimated. Then,
when using some specific loss functions, we can solve
∇w¯t`(zt, w¯t) = Θ for zt as follows:
Hinge loss ∇w¯t`(zt, w¯t) = 0D (an all-zero vector of size
D) if 1 − ytw¯>t xt < 0 or −ytxt otherwise. If Θ is a
non-zero vector, then zt = (Θ,−1) or (−Θ, 1).
Logistic loss ∇w¯t`(zt, w¯t) = −ytxt1+exp(ytw¯>t xt) =−X
1+exp(w¯>t X)
, where w¯t is known and X = ytxt. X
can be obtained numerically (e.g., via the Newton’s
method), and zt = (X, 1) or (−X,−1).
Note that this problem of sample leakage can happen
also when users have just a single image in their storage.
A.2.2 Gradient Descent
When users have more than one image, it might be nat-
ural to use a gradient descent (GD) technique instead of
SGD. Namely, we evaluate the loss gradient averaged over
the whole data ∇w¯t`(Z, w¯t) = 1K
∑
i∇w¯t`(zi, w¯t) in-
stead of that of a single sample. Although this averaging
can prevent one from identifying individual sample zi, the
equation ∇w¯t`(Z, w¯t) = Θ still reveals some statistics of
private data Z . Specifically, if the class balance of data is
extremely biased, one can guess an average of samples that
were not classified correctly. One typical case of class un-
balance arises when learning a detector of abnormal events.
This will regard most of training samples as negative ones.
Let us consider an extreme case where all of the samples
owned by a single user belong to the negative class, i.e.,
yi = −1 ∀zi = (xi, yi) ∈ Z . If we use the hinge loss, a
set of samples that were not classified perfectly is described
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Figure 5. Image Reconstruction from Features with [16]
by Z¯ = {zi = (xi, yi) | yiw¯>t xi < 1} ⊆ Z . Then, the
averaged loss gradient is transformed as follows:
∇w¯t`(Z, w¯t) =
1
K
∑
zi∈Z¯
−yixi = 1
K
∑
zi∈Z¯
xi = Θ.
(13)
Namely, Θ is proportional to the average of samples that
were not classified correctly.
For the logistic loss, when yi = −1, the loss gradient
with respect to a single sample becomes ∇w¯t`(zi, w¯t) =xi
1+exp(−w¯>t xi)
= P (yi = 1 | xi)xi, where P (yi = 1 |
xi) is close to 0 when zi is classified correctly as negative,
and increases up to 1 when classified incorrectly as positive.
Then, the averaged loss gradient becomes:
∇w¯t`(Z, w¯t) =
1
K
∑
i
P (yi = 1 | xi)xi = Θ. (14)
If all the samples are classified confidently, i.e., |w¯>t xi| 
0 ∀zi ∈ Z , Θ is again proportional to the average of sam-
ples not classified correctly.
A.2.3 Reconstructing Images from Features
The previous sections demonstrated that classifiers updated
locally via SGD/GD could expose a part of trained fea-
ture vectors. We argue that users will further suffer from
a higher privacy risk when the features could be inverted to
original images (e.g., [16, 45, 65]). Figure 5 showed ex-
amples on image reconstruction from features using [16] on
some images from Caltech101 [24]. We extracted outputs
of the fc6 layer of the Caffe reference network used in the
open source library4. Although reconstructed images do not
currently describe the fine-details of original images (e.g.,
contents displayed on the laptop), they could still capture
the whole picture indicating what were recorded or where
they were recorded.
A.3. Additional Experimental Results
In the original paper, we evaluated our approach on a
variety of tasks not only object classification on the classic
Caltech Datasets [24, 29] but also face attribute recognition
4http://lmb.informatik.uni-freiburg.de/
resources/software.php
Table 5. Video Attribute Recognition Results on the Part of
YouTube8M Dataset: mean average precision (mAP) for the top
10, 50, and 100 frequently-annotated attributes.
Methods mAP (∼10) (∼50) (∼100) Privacy
PRR10 [49] 0.62 0.45 0.38 3
RA12 [52] 0.60 0.45 0.37 3
No-PP 0.70 0.55 0.48 7
DPHE 0.70 0.53 0.47 3
and sensitive place detection on a large-scale dataset [22,
44]. This section introduces some additional experimental
results using different tasks or datasets.
Video Attribute Recognition on YouTube8M Subset
We evaluated the proposed method (DPHE) as well as the
two privacy-preserving baselines (PPR10 [49], RA12 [52])
on a video attribute recognition task using a part of
YouTube8M dataset [1]. Specifically, we picked 227,476
videos from the training set and 79,398 videos from the val-
idation set. Similar to the data preparation in Section 3.2
of the original paper, 50,000 videos of our training set were
left for the initialization data and the rest was split into five
to serve as private data with N = 5. Although over 4,000
attributes like ‘Games,’ ‘Vehicle,’ and ‘Pina Records.’ were
originally annotated to each video, our evaluation used the
top 100 frequent attributes that were annotated to more than
1,000 videos in our training set. For each video, we ex-
tracted outputs of the global average pooling layer of the
deep residual network [32] trained on ImageNet [53] ev-
ery 30 frame (about once in a second) and average them to
get a single 2048-dimensional feature vector. Table 5 de-
scribes the mean average precision (mAP) for the top 10,
50, and 100 frequently-annotated attributes. We confirmed
that DPHE outperformed the two privacy-preserving base-
lines. The sparsity of locally-updated classifiers was 65%
on average, which resulted in about 3.5 minutes for the en-
cryption. In order to see the original performance obtained
by using residual network features, we introduced another
baseline (No-PP in the table) that learned an L2-regularized
linear SVM on the whole training data via SGD. The results
demonstrated that the performance with DPHE was almost
comparable to that with No-PP.
Clustering on Caltech101/256 Unlike the other privacy-
preserving baselines [49, 52], DPHE can also be applied
to an unsupervised clustering task based on mini-batch k-
means [57]. Instead of learning a classifier with the ini-
tialization data, an aggregator first runs k-means++ [6] to
distribute cluster centroids to users. Users then update the
centroids locally with sparse constraints. We used the L1-
regularized stochastic k-means [36] to obtain the sparse
centroids. Regularization strength (η in [36]) was chosen
Table 6. Clustering Results on Caltech101/256: adjusted mutual
information scores given the correct number of clusters.
Methods Caltech101 Caltech256 Privacy
S10 [57] 0.733 0.630 7
DPHE 0.753 0.614 3
adaptively so that the sparsity of cluster centroids was more
than 90% on average. Table 6 shows an adjusted mutual
information score of the clustering task on Caltech101 [24]
and Caltech256 [29]. As a baseline method, we chose a
standard mini-batch k-means (S10 [57]). For all of the
methods, the number of image categories was given as the
number of clusters, i.e., we assumed that the correct clus-
ter number was known. We found that DPHE achieved a
comparable performance to the baseline method.
A.4. Security Evaluation
Finally, we introduce a formal version of our security
evaluation on Algorithm 1 that supplements Section 2.5 in
the original paper. Recall that our framework involves the
following three types of parties:
Definition 1 (Types of parties). Let U (1), . . . , U (N) be N
users,A be an aggregator, andG be a key generator. We as-
sume that they are all semi-honest [47] and do not collude.
U (n) has private data w(n) ∈ RD. U (n) can communi-
cate only with A and G, while A and G can communicate
with all of the parties. U (j) (j 6= n) may be malicious and
intercept data sent from U (n) to A.
With DPHE, private data w(n) is first decomposed into
w(n) = K(n)v(n), where v(n) ∈ RM , K(n) ∈ {0, 1}D,M ,
and M is an encryption capacity indicating the maximum
number of values that are Paillier encrypted. K(n) is called
an index matrix and defined as follows:
Definition 2 (Index matrix). An index matrix of w ∈ RD
given v ∈ RM is a binary matrix K ∈ {0, 1}D×M such
that the number of ones for each column is exact one and
that for each row is at most one and w = Kv. Let KD,M
be a set of all possible index matrices of size D ×M .
To make v(n) secure, we use the Paillier encryption [48].
On the encrypted data ζ
(
v(n)
)
, the following lemma holds
based on Theorem 14 and Theorem 15 in [48]:
Lemma 3 (Paillier Encryption [48]). Let ζ (v) be a vector
which is obtained by encrypting v with the Paillier cryp-
tosystem. Then, no one can identify v from ζ (v) without a
decryption key.
Note that the Paillier encryption of v(n) also helps to
keep secret the number of non-zeros in w(n) since M is
always greater than or equal to the non-zero number.
On the other hand, DPHE doubly-permutes K(n),
namely Φ
(
K(n)
)
= φ(n)φK(n), where φ(n),φ ∈
{0, 1}D×D is a permutation matrix defined as follows:
Definition 4 (Permutation matrix). A permutation matrix
that permutes D elements is a square binary matrix φ ∈
{0, 1}D×D such that the number of one for each column
and for each row is exact one. LetΩD be a set of all possible
permutation matrices of size D.
In DPHE, U (n) has both φ and φ(n) but does not have
{φ(j) | j 6= n}, while A has {φ(n) | n = 1, . . . , N} but
does not have φ. In what follows we prove that without
having both of φ and φ(n), one cannot identify K(n) from
Φ
(
K(n)
)
(i.e., only U (n) can identify K(n)). As prelimi-
naries, we introduce several properties of index and permu-
tation matrices based on Definition 2 and Definition 4.
Corollary 5 (Properties of index matrices). For φ ∈ ΩD
and K ∈ KD,M , φK ∈ KD,M .
Corollary 6 (Properties of permutation matrices). For
φ,φ′ ∈ ΩD, φ−1 = φ> ∈ ΩD, and φφ′ ∈ ΩD.
Then, the following lemma about Φ
(
K(n)
)
holds:
Lemma 7 (Reordering Φ
(
K(n)
)
). Let Φ
(
K(n)
)
=
φ(n)φK(n) ∈ KD,M where φ(n),φ ∈ ΩD and K(n) ∈
KD,M . Suppose that Φ
(
K(n)
)
is known and K(n) is un-
known. Then, K(n) can be determined uniquely if and only
if both φ and φ(n) are known.
Proof. If both of φ and φ(n) are known, K(n) can be de-
termined uniquely as K(n) = φ>(φ(n))>Φ
(
K(n)
)
where
the variables in the RHS are all known. To prove the ‘only-
if’ proposition, we introduce its contrapositive: ‘if at least
one of φ and φ(n) is unknown, K(n) cannot be determined
uniquely.’ Let φ′ = φ>(φ(n))> ∈ ΩD (which is also a
permutation matrix as shown in Corollary 6) which is un-
known when at least one of φ and φ(n) is unknown. For
arbitrary φ′, K(n) = φ′Φ
(
K(n)
)
is always an index ma-
trix as shown in Corollary 5. Therefore, K(n) cannot be
determined uniquely as long as φ′ is not fixed. This means
that the contrapositive is true, and Lemma 7 is proved.
The combination of Lemma 3 and Lemma 7 proves that
the aggregator A and user U (j) (j 6= n) cannot iden-
tify U (n)’s private data w(n) and its non-zero indices from
encrypted data ζ
(
v(n)
)
,Φ
(
K(n)
)
. The remaining con-
cern is if one can identify w(n) or its non-zero indices
from w¯ = 1N
∑
nw
(n). As shown in the original paper,
when N ≥ 3, it is impossible for any party to decompose∑
nw
(n) into individual w(n)’s or to decompose non-zero
indices of w¯ into those of individual w(n)’s, as long as all
parties are semi-honest and do not collude to share private
information outside the algorithm.
To conclude, the following theorem is proved:
Theorem 8 (Security on Algorithm 1). After running
Algorithm 1 by semi-honest and non-colluding parties
U (1), . . . , U (N), A, and G where N ≥ 3, no one but U (n)
can identify private dataw(n) and its non-zero indices from
obtained information.
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